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MILITARY LEADERSHIP 5 – INTER-SERVICE COOPERATION

Introduction

A question I have often asked myself is whether the same rules of leadership apply across all the three Services. To some, this may be a non-question, but there is more to it. Take for example, helicopter pilots, often an aircraft operates singly in hostile territory and troops make requests which in normal times would be turned down, but the Captain of the helicopter decides to accede to the request in view of the circumstances on the ground. Is this leadership, is it just cooperating beyond the call of duty, or is it just personal inclination? I have no ready answers but the following incidents should help in clarifying matters. My experience was that very rarely would a pilot supporting us, army or air force refuse a request from the ground troops.


In Sri Lanka, the IPKF had one major asset which the LTTE could never match and that was the air support we had available. We had light helicopters, Cheetas (Alouettes) of the Air OP, Chetaks (Alouettes) of the Indian Air Force who provided intimate support and casualty evacuation and the MI-17 helicopters, which provided supply support, troop transportation for operations and in many cases, casualty evacuation. The IPKF also had support of AN-32 transport aircraft, but that was beyond the purview of my command.


Beyond the Call of Duty

It was early February 1988, we were just settling in to operations and 16 Garhwal had cleared and occupied Puthukkudiyruppu (PKI). This place was reputed to be a stronghold of the LTTE. While the battalion was still in the process of clearing the adjoining area, the initial helipad was restricted and required some skilled flying to land and take off.


In these circumstances, an Air Force Chetak landed at our HQ. Its commander was a burly Sikh Wing Commander, whose name escapes me; but his co-pilot was a young officer called Rawat. The Wingco asked if he could do anything for us, he was just transiting. I took the opportunity to ask if he would take me to PKI and the request was readily agreed to. In a short while, we were with CO of 16 Garhwal, Lt. Col. J.P. Barthwal. The co-pilot, Rawat was at home among his fellow Garhwalis (and that is why I remember the name).


As we were about to return, the CO asked if we could take the battalion’s batteries to the Brigade HQ for charging. The pilot asked what the weight was. Ask the Infantry anything but such questions. No one knew. The Wingco was unsure if his helicopter could take off in the restricted flight path with the additional weight. Then he took the decision, let us try, he said and we all piled in, the batteries occupying a large space.


As we took off, I could see the pilot, he was struggling with the weight and sweat poured off his face. However, in a minute or so, we had gained sufficient height to gain forward speed. When we landed back, the pilot said that for a moment it had been touch and go, but he had been glad to help. Anything else? Well, we had not had mail for some days, so off he went to Vavuniya to get it for us. His base was at Jaffna to our north, yet he was willing to go far south for our mail. It was late afternoon, when he just stopped off at Mullaittivu to drop the mail bags and carry on to Jaffna.


We never met again, but by this one action, the pilot had endeared the Air Force to my entire Brigade. In another instance, we had a casualty at Mullaittivu who required evacuation at night. MI-17s had night flying capability but while lighting was available at Vavuniya, there was none at Mullaittivu. The officer-in-charge at Vavuniya at that time was a Wing Commander Banerjee who was always ready to help. He told us to just have two or three vehicles light up the landing point with their headlights and he would ensure that the helicopter landed and picked up the casualty. This is exactly how it happened. No fuss, no drum beating, just plain competence and a will to help. It is only later that I found out that the first pilot Banerjee had tasked for the flight had refused to fly, so he asked for volunteers of whom there was no shortage. He then flew with the sortie to Mullaittivu, saw the casualty loaded into the helicopter and went back. We on the ground knew none of this, till we heard of it by chance a few days later.


In yet another incident we were helped by an Air Force MI 17 pilot whose name I never found out. After one operation, I was standing at the edge of the jungle where our casualties had been brought out and were awaiting evacuation. There were about 20 of them and given that we had only light helicopters for casualty evacuation, it would have taken a long time to evacuate them. The firing had just died down, when we saw this MI 17 passing overhead. We had a radio to communicate with the aircraft and I told my Signals officer to contact him and ask if he would land to pick up our casualties. There was no helipad, just a clearing. Pat came the reply, ‘Confirm helipad secure’. We told him that there was no helipad, it was not secure but there was no firing. We saw him turn, hurriedly lit a smoke candle, as he came down. We told him not to switch off, loaded our casualties and off he went, taking all our casualties. It was an instant decision taken by the captain of the aircraft, all on his own, if something had gone wrong, it would have been his responsibility.


I have taken the latter two examples from my book, ‘Ours Not to Reason Why’ where I have explained in greater detail, the help we received from the Air Force.


Our Army pilots were equally willing and daring. Long after retirement, I was asked to contribute my experiences with the Air OP in Sri Lanka for an Army Aviation coffee table book published in 2006. Some extracts are relevant:


“Air OP’s contribution to the operations in Sri Lanka was immense. 7 Infantry Brigade . . . was squarely located in the midst of the LTTE’s citadel . . . Usually our only support was the MMG mounted helicopters of the Air OP. There were other Flights that supported us from time to time, but for armed support we depended on the Ranjits.

The pilots of the Ranjits would do everything and more that was asked of them. They strafed from the air, directed artillery fire, located and guided sub-units lost in the jungles, carried out emergency casualty evacuation and always brought our mail. They became part of our Brigade. Immensely proud and confident of their aircraft, the pilots were highly skilled, professional and fearless. They would go anywhere, land on the smallest of clearings in the jungle to lift a casualty or drop a commander.

They (the pilots) loved to fly and get to grips with the adversary. In this they were wholly successful. For their efforts, we who were supported will always remain grateful.”


Indian Navy

For reasons which are not known to me, the Indian Navy support was conspicuous by its absence in our operations in Sri Lanka. This was strange, because we were operating in many areas along the coast. I was once told that only boats with shallow draught could operate there and hence we could not be given seaward support. Frankly, I do not know enough. But even then I used to think that we allowed the LTTE unfettered freedom off the coast. If only we could have interdicted them there, much could have been achieved. But that, as I have said was out of my reach.


Conclusion

Even as I write this it occurs to me in the light of all that has been written in this series of blogs, that operations, however small, require every individual to act beyond himself. It is the innate leadership qualities of every person that come to the fore and also gets an opportunity to manifest itself. That is why a pilot takes a difficult decision on his own, a jawan will risk his life to carry out his task, and a young officer will lead his men from the front without worrying about what happens next.


So the bottom line is that the Services expect, instill and train their officers and men in leadership, which is what serves us well in battle. It follows that training must emphasize this. This is a thought process I shall explore in my next and last blog in this series of posts on Military Leadership.


Finally, a request. If any reader can identify the Air Force officers in this piece, I shall be very glad to acknowledge their contribution, even after so many years.


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