Introduction
In the early 1960s, a popular book by Field Marshal Slim was ‘Courage and Other Speeches’. It is a book still worth reading. Slim says that courage formed a part of the fabric of British character. I have often recollected that phrase and realized that this is equally true of the Indian people, not just soldiers but across the spectrum of society.
Today, I propose to narrate a few examples of courage that I have personally witnessed and analyse them. It is my contention that courage and bravery on the battlefield are more of a team effort. If an individual shines, it is because of the team that he leads or is a part of and which supports him. Often when a unit or sub-unit does not do well, it is as much a systemic failure as an individual failure.
I am conscious that every reader will have his own opinions and some will disagree with what I say. This is how it should be.
On the Battlefield
In Northern Sri Lanka, in early 1988, a company of 11 Garhwal led by Capt. Sanjeev Bhoite found itself surrounded by the LTTE in thick jungle. In fact, unknowingly they had inserted themselves in a space between two camps. The initiative and surprise lay with the LTTE. In the first volley of fire, the leading section all became casualties, some killed, some wounded. The company was thin on the ground and being fired upon from all sides. There was nowhere to go and Bhoite and his men courageously did not panic and held on.
After a little while, the firing decreased and the leading men with Bhoite among them heard the LTTE organizing a charge to pick up the weapons of the dead. Young Bhoite, in the heat of the moment, picked up the few men around him and shouting the Garhwali war cry, ‘Jai Badri Vishal’ charged the LTTE instead forcing them to withdraw. Knowing that reinforcements would soon arrive, the LTTE took advantage of the lull to withdraw from the camps.
Later, when I asked Bhoite why he had acted the way he did, he had no explanation. He just did it.
Yet another time, much later, a patrol of 6/8 GR was moving by the seashore at night. It consisted of a Havildar, six men and a Madras Sapper, who also acted as an interpreter.The night was not so silent with the waves breaking on the shore and wind rustling the palm leaves. Suddenly the patrol heard a LMG being cocked and froze. The Havildar asked the Tamil Sapper to call out, ‘Yardai, yardai’ (who is it?) While the LTTE men were confused, the patrol divided themselves into two and rushed the men in front from both sides. No shots, no shouting, they captured four LTTE men and two weapons including the cocked LMG with the safety catch on ‘S’.
Again when I asked the Havildar why he had done what he had, he just smiled. ‘Kar diya’, (did it).
In both incidents, the reaction was instinctive, but why it was instinctive, no one knew. Even as these incidents occurred, both these Units were gathering themselves after having suffered severe casualties in earlier actions. So they were not building on success, rather they were laying foundations for it.
Off the Battlefield in Operations
The next two examples are both of Subedar Majors (SM). Ganesh Singh Rawat was SM of 16 Garhwal and he was to proceed on pension in Feb 1988. The Battalion having just cleared a stronghold of the LTTE had suffered heavy casualties in clearing the surrounding areas and were unsettled. The CO and all ranks were straining every sinew to get on top of the situation. Some days later I ran into the SM, he had not yet left for pension. When asked, he told me that he could not leave his battalion like this. He would go when the men settled to their task. The CO could not make the SM leave. Finally SM Rawat left only when he was satisfied, hang what anyone thought.
Readers will recall that in June 1988, there was an operation against terrorists in the Golden Temple. 22 Sikh was in my Brigade. Having heard of what followed Operation Blue Star, I thought my rightful place was with the jawans of the battalion. The bulk of the Unit was out on road opening when I reached there. Later in the day, Sub Maj Ajit Singh returned and came to see me immediately and asked outright why had I come? When I started explaining, he cut me short. ‘So you don’t trust us?’ Nothing would pacify him. His CO was still out and there were just the two of us. He told me to go away. ‘Nothing untoward will happen, it is my responsibility’, he said. I am happy to record that I left and 22 Sikh remained as steady as ever.
Is this courage?
These incidents took place over 25 years ago. Each of these were individual decisions and none could explain why they had done what they had. Is this instinct, is it training, is it regimental spirit and traditions, is it confidence in oneself and one’s subordinates and yes, superiors? Analyse it whichever way you like, it is a combination of all these factors.
The point is that ultimately, it is the team that delivers. And therein lies the lesson. Often I have seen individuals blamed, units suffer. Fair enough, every man on the battlefield is accountable. But it is my considered opinion that each of us in the chain of command has to carry his share of the blame, irrespective of seniority.
Op Pawan in Sri Lanka was characterized by poor leadership, top downwards.
Conclusion
If the reader feels that this argument has been left in mid-air, it is correct. What I shall do is in the next blog, take some shining examples of inter-service cooperation with the Indian Air Force helicopter pilots and may be tie it all together in the final post in this series about leadership.
Those who feel strongly are requested to state their views either as comments on the blog or in mail to me. Hopefully, we shall share each other’s experiences.
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